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Abstract. Low-quality products may cause consumer harm. A rm can reduce the
probability of low quality through ex ante investment before sales, and can take rem-
edy actions such as product recalls if it learns after sales that product quality is low.
An increase in the rms product liability increases its incentive for ex post remedy;
more ex post remedy, however, may reduce the rms ex ante quality investment. On
the other hand, higher product liability increases consumer demand for the product,
resulting in high output and hence greater return to ex ante investment. The trade-
o¤ between these two e¤ects, the substitution e¤ectand the output e¤ect, can
lead to an inverted U-shaped relationship between ex ante investment and product
liability. We nd that the rm always prefers full liability whereas consumers might
be better o¤with less than full liability. Full product liability tends to be socially op-
timal when the potential consumer loss from low quality is su¢ ciently high; otherwise
partial liability can be socially optimal.
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1. INTRODUCTION
If the use of a rms product results in consumer harm due to poor product qual-
ity, what should be the rms liability? Under the rule of full liability, the rm is
required to fully compensate the consumer for the harm; whereas under the rule of
partial liability, the expected compensation to the consumer is lower than the con-
sumers loss. There have been substantial interests in the product liability issue in
law and economics, primarily because liability rules can have important impacts on
rm incentives and economic e¢ ciency. One literature has focused on the e¤ects of
product liability on a rms incentives for ex ante actions. Liability rules can a¤ect a
rms precaution to ensure product safety (Simon, 1981) or its quality choice (Polin-
sky and Rogerson, 1983). In addition to product quality choice, product liability
also a¤ects a rms incentive to disclose quality information through price and other
devices (Daughety and Reinganum, 1995; 2008a; 2008b).1
With a di¤erent focus, another literature has studied the e¤ects of product liability
on a rms incentives for ex post actions. Welling (1991) shows that a rm makes
recalls in order to build its reputation in the market, whereas Marino (1997) argues
that mandatory recalls motivate rms to increase product safety before sales. Spier
(2009) analyzes a rms incentives to buyback unsafe products and nds that the rm
o¤ers a lower buyback price than socially desired. Hua (2009) compares strict liability
to negligence rules when a rms recall not only depends on its own costs/liability
but also on consumersreturn incentives.2
In practice, changes in product liability can a¤ect both rmsex ante investment
1Furthermore, in relation to product liability, a rms choices between settlement and litigation
and between condential and open settlement may also a¤ect its ex-ante quality choice (Daughety
and Reinganum, 2005; 2006).
2For empirical work related to product recalls, see, for example, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985),
Hartman (1987), Ho¤er, Rruitt, and Reilly (1988), and Rupp and Taylor (2002).
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action and ex post actions such as product recalls. For one example, in 2008, the US
Senate discussed a bill which would give the Consumer Product Safety Commission
more power to collect and disclose allegations of injuries. The supporters claimed that
the bill would encourage rms to design safer products. However, some other people
argued that the bill would increase rmsliabilities by too much, which might cause
more product recalls but more violations of safety regulations (less safe products).3
These debates are related to the more general question: what is the relationship
between rmsex ante investment in product safety and ex post remedies such as
product recalls? Would larger product liability motivate rms to increase or decrease
ex ante investment before sales? For another example, in the automobile industry,
manufactures could spend more time in safety design, which typically delays the
marketing of new models. Alternatively, they could reduce the delay and ex ante
investment, but collect further data and modify the design after sales.4
In this paper, we bridge and extend the two literatures by analyzing the potential
e¤ects of product liability on both ex ante quality investment and ex post remedy
activities by the rm.5 We consider a setting where, before sales, a rm can make
observable quality investment,6 and after sales, it learns about the realization of
quality and can take remedy if the product is of low quality or is unsafe (so that there
3Business Insurance, March 17, 2008
4For example, automobile manufacturers have rushed to promote their new SUVs, though there
were many warns about safety issues. Later on these rms modied the safety design after Ford and
Firestone recalled Explorers with tire problems. (Los Angeles Times, March 14, 2010)
5Spier (2009) discusses how buybacks a¤ect ex ante quality investment, assuming that consumers
are homogeneous in the ex ante period. Di¤erently, our paper considers product recalls and hetero-
geneous consumers.
6By assuming that ex ante investment is publicly observable, we abstract from considerations
such as the signaling role of prices and the rms incentives for information disclosure, which have
been studied in the literature.
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might be consumer harm).7 We investigate the interactions between the rms ex
post remedy and ex ante investment, how both activities depend on product liability,
and the privately versus socially optimal liability rules. Our analysis identies two
potential e¤ects of product liability on a rms ex ante investment incentive: (i)
Substitution e¤ect : An increase in product liability increases the rms incentive for
ex post remedy, which, however, may reduce the rms incentive for ex ante quality
investment. (ii)Output e¤ect : Higher product liability increases consumer demand for
the product and leads to higher equilibrium output given ex ante investment (despite
a higher expected marginal cost to the rm and a higher price), which increases the
return to (incentive for) ex ante quality investment. These two opposing e¤ects can
lead to an inverted U-shaped relationship between ex ante quality investment and
product liability, with the highest investment sometimes obtained when there is less
than full liability.
We further show that the rm always prefers full liability, whereas consumer surplus
and social welfare may be higher under partial liability. The rms preference for
full liability arises in our model primarily because of the endogeneity of consumer
demand and the commitment role of product liability. In the absence of reputation
considerations and of a legal requirement from the liability law, the rm lacks the
ex post incentive to take remedy such as product recall should its product cause
consumer harm due to low quality, which lowers consumer demand. Full product
liability enables the rm to commit to taking such ex post remedy and internalizing
the loss to consumers, which leads to higher consumer demand and to levels of ex
post remedy and ex ante investment that are optimal for the rm. If only ex post
remedy were feasible, consumers would also prefer full product liability. When ex
ante investment is also possible, however, consumers may prefer less than full product
7We can thus think of a low-quality product in our setting as one with some defects, which could
cause consumer harm.
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liability, and the reason is more subtle. A lower liability may increase the rms ex
ante investment, due to the substitution e¤ect, which improves product quality and
possibly to higher equilibrium output. Because the rm is unable to appropriate
all the consumer gains from higher product quality and higher output, its ex ante
investment tends to be ine¢ ciently low under full liability.8 Thus partial liability can
result in higher consumer surplus and social welfare than full liability.9
In particular, holding all else constant, when the potential consumer loss from low
quality is large enough, the output e¤ect dominates the substitution e¤ect on ex ante
investment, in which case full liability motivates higher ex ante investment and more
sales than partial liability. In this case, it is socially optimal to implement full product
liability. In contrast, when the potential loss is at an intermediate level, the substi-
tution e¤ect can dominate the output e¤ect, in which case partial liability leads to
higher ex ante investment, and hence can result in higher consumer surplus and social
welfare. Similarly, holding all else constant, full liability is socially optimal if ex post
remedy cost is large enough or if the e¤ectiveness of remedy is small enough, whereas
partial liability can benet consumers and increase social welfare when neither is too
large or too small. These ndings provide important policy implications on product
liability. Moreover, they also have related policy implications on limited enforcement
of warranty, consumer negligence, and punitive damage compensation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model and
discusses related applications. Section 3 examines how the liability rule a¤ects the
rms ex post remedy choice and ex ante quality investment. Section 4 characterizes
8Given the equilibrium output, if L = D (full liability), the rms ex post remedy incentive
coincides with that of the society.
9Other studies have also shown that full liability may not be socially optimal, but it is usually
because of potential ine¢ cient behavior (or negligence) from consumers (e.g., Brown, 1973; Diamond,
1974; Shavell, 1980). Our result is obtained without consumer moral hazard. We discuss the issue
of consumer negligence in Section 5.
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the prot-maximizing versus socially optimal liability rules. Section 5 discusses sev-
eral related policies and possible extensions, including product warranty and return
policies, consumer negligence, punitive damage compensation, and the robustness of
our results. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2. THE MODEL
There are two periods: the ex ante period when a rm sells its product to heteroge-
neous consumers, and the ex post period when the rm learns additional information
about product quality (or safety) and may take remedies such as product recalls or
product upgrades.
In the ex ante period, before sales, the true product quality is uncertain, with 
representing the probability that the product is of high quality and 1    the prob-
ability that the product is of low quality. The rm can make investment to increase
the high-quality probability,  2 [0; ]. The investment costs, k(), is increasing and
strictly convex in , with k0(0) = 0. We assume that there is always a non-trivial
probability that the product is of low quality. That is,  < 1. This assumption reects
the reality that the rm cannot perfectly control the product quality. Assume that 
is close to one.
Consumers can observe the rms investment level. However, before sales, neither
the rm nor consumers can observe the true quality of the product. These assump-
tions capture two features of ex ante quality investments for many products. While
a rm can invest to have safer product designs, test product quality under di¤erent
scenarios, or add precaution devices, there can still be uncertainty on product qual-
ity, which the rm may learn only after the product is used by (some) consumers.
Also, in marketing their products, rms have incentives to disclose their quality in-
vestment through product certicates, user manuals, or product tests. Alternatively,
government or government agencies often require rms to disclose their product qual-
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ity before sales. These disclosures indirectly reect rmsquality investment. For
example, an automobile manufacturer has to disclose the outcomes of car tests and
consumers can observe the safety designs.
The total mass of consumers is normalized to 1. Consumersvalues for the prod-
uct, when it is of high quality, are distributed according to c.d.f. F (v) ; with a
corresponding density function f(v) > 0 on support v 2 [0; v]. We impose the regu-
larity condition that f(v) is log-concave (i.e., d2 ln f (v) =dv2  0).10 This condition
implies that the hazard rate,  (v)  f(v)
1 F (v) ; is non-decreasing (i.e., 
0 (v)  0): Dene
the inverse hazard rate as H (v)  1
(v)
. If the product is of low quality, it may reduce
consumers value or cause harm to consumers (independently) with probability ,
which is also uncertain ex ante and follows a distribution G(), with a correspond-
ing density function g() > 0 on [0; 1].11 When a consumer is harmed, her value is
reduced by D.
After making the quality investment, the rm sets its price, and each consumer
decides whether to purchase the product based on her realized v; her expectations
about ;  and potential remedies by the rm if the product is of low quality. The
rms total sales is dened as Q:
In the ex post period, after sales, the rm privately learns the true quality of the
product. If the product is of low quality, the rm also privately learns the realization
of  (how serious the defect is). The rm may then choose to take ex post remedy to
improve the product quality. However, the ex post remedy is not fully e¤ective and
can only x a proportion  < 1 of the sold product, with remedy costs CQ. For
example, in most product recalls, not all consumers are informed about the recall or
10This assumption is satised by familiar distributions including uniform, exponential, normal,
truncated t-distribution, and extreme-value distribution.
11As we mentioned earlier in the Introduction, we can think of a low-quality product as containing
some defect. A more serious defect has a higher probability () to cause consumer harm.
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will return the product (possibly due to inconvenience or return costs).12 We assume
that  is exogenously given here.13
If a consumer is harmed, the rm will give compensation L to the consumer accord-
ing to product liability. The rm bears "partial liability" if L < D, "full liability"
if L = D, and punitive damage compensation if L > D. Note that our framework
can be applied in two di¤erent scenarios. Under the scenario of product safety, a
product of low quality may harm consumers. After learning the potential harm, the
rm can make product recalls to x or replace the defected product. If a consumer
is harmed, the rm bears liability L. Under an alternative scenario, a product of low
quality may not deliver the expected value to consumers. For example, after selling
a medical equipment or drug, a pharmaceutical rm may learn that this equipment
or drug could not deliver the surgery e¤ects claimed during sales. Then the rm can
upgrade the equipment or replace with another new drug for the consumers. Simi-
larly, after sales, a manufacturer of an industrial machine may nd that the machine
would depreciate more quickly than the claimed usage life. Then the rm can take
remedy to extend the usage life. In both types of applications, L could be the liability
determined by courts or given by the rms warranty. In the basic model, we will
focus on policies determined by courts or governments. In Section 5, we will discuss
what happens if the rm can choose the warranty level itself.
12In practice, most recalls have low return rates. For example, the return rates of many product
recalls were between 10% and 30% (New York Times, April 12, 2002). Even for automobiles, the
return rates were estimated to be between 20% and 70% (The Philadelphia Inquirer, September 10,
2000).
13In Sections 4 and 5, we will also separately examine two policies that a¤ect : (1) Government
may require the rm to keep better records of consumersinformation during sales and monitor the
rms information disclosure when taking ex post remedies. Such policies can increase . (2) Courts
may adopt contributory negligence rule or set a lower standard in determining consumer negligence:
the rms liability may be reduced or denied if consumers do not comply with the rms remedy.
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3. EX ANTE INVESTMENT AND EX POST REMEDY
In this section, we rst derive the expected costs of low quality to the rm and to
the consumers, which determine the expected social cost. We then derive consumer
demand and the rms optimal output. One key observation is that the rms optimal
output can be expressed as a function of investment  and the expected social cost
per unit of output (), which allows us to conveniently characterize two benchmarks
where either ex ante investment is not considered (so that  is given) or ex post
remedy is not available. We then analyze our general case where the rm can take
both ex ante investment and ex post remedy, and examine how the rms optimal
quality investment depends on the rms liability L, the unit remedy cost C, the
e¤ectiveness of remedy , and potential damage D.14
In the ex-post period, suppose that the rm nds product quality to be low. Then
the rm will take remedy if and only if CQ < LQ, or equivalently,15  > C
L
:That
is, there will be ex post remedy only when it is su¢ ciently likely for consumers to be
harmed. Therefore, from the ex ante point of view, given low product quality, the
rms expected ex post cost per unit of output is
x =
Z C
L
0
LdG() +
Z 1
C
L
[C + (1  )L]dG(); (1)
whereas the expected ex post loss for any consumer using a low-quality product is
14Strictly speaking, we solve for the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. When it
will not cause confusion, we simply describe the equilibrium actions of the rm and the consumers
as optimal actions.
15With probability 1   ; a consumer will not participate in the rms ex post remedy. Un-
der strict liability, the rm will then have the same expected ex post cost from such a consumer,
 (1  )LQ; whether or not it takes remedy actions. In Section 5, we discuss how our analysis
would be a¤ected if a consumer needs to bear responsibility for negligence.
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y =
Z C
L
0
(D   L)dG() +
Z 1
C
L
(1  )(D   L)dG(): (2)
Thus, given low product quality, the expected ex post social cost per unit of output
is given by
  x+ y =
Z C
L
0
DdG() +
Z 1
C
L
[C + (1  )D]dG(): (3)
Notice that
d
dL
= D
C
L
g

C
L

  C
L2

+ [C + (1  )C
L
D]g

C
L

C
L2
= g

C
L

C
L2
C

1  D
L

: (4)
Simple calculations lead to the following:
Lemma 1 (i) Ex post, d=dL Q 0 if L Q D; and it is socially e¢ cient to have
L = D. (ii) d=dD > 0; d=dC > 0; and d=d < 0: .
Intuitively, if the rm bears full liability L = D, it will make the socially e¢ cient
decision on ex post remedy. If L < D, then there will be too few remedies relative to
the socially desired; if L > D, there will be too many remedies.16 Note that L > D
includes punitive damage compensation. Although in theory punitive compensation
can be implemented, in practice punitive compensation often cannot be too large
because rms usually face nancial constraints. For convenience, we restrict our
analysis to the case with L  D.17
16In our model, there is no ex-post heterogeneity among consumers. This simplies the ex-post
e¢ ciency analysis, allowing us to focus on the interaction between ex-ante investment and ex-post
remedy. If consumers face heterogeneous harm or return costs, then the rm may not have the right
incentives to make socially e¢ cient remedy even when L = D (Hua, 2009; and Spier, 2009).
17In Section 5, we will discuss the possibility of allowing L > D: For any given L0 > D, as long as
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Given the anticipated ex post cost, a consumer will buy the product ex ante if and
only if her value is large enough:
v   p  (1  )y  0:
Correspondingly, the total demand for the rms product is
Q = 1  F (p+ (1  )y);
or, the inverse demand is
p = F 1(1 Q)  (1  )y: (5)
Given the ex ante quality investment , the rm chooses Q to maximize its prot
()  max
Q1
Q [p  (1  )x] = max
Q1
Q[F 1(1 Q)  (1  )(x+ y)]
= max
Q1
Q[F 1(1 Q)  (1  )]: (6)
Under the monotone hazard rate, it is easy to verify that the above objective
function is concave. The rst order condition is
F 1(1 Q)  Q
f [F 1(1 Q)] = (1  ): (7)
Dene
t = F 1(1 Q); (8)
then t monotonically decreases in Q; and equation (7) becomes
L0 is not too large, there exists a certain level L < D which leads to the same ex post social cost,
that is, (L) = (L0). As it will become clear shortly, the rms ex ante quality investment only
depends on the expected social cost ; and consequently it is without loss of generality to assume
L  D as long as L cannot be much higher than D.
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t  1  F (t)
f(t)
= (1  ): (9)
Dene the rms prot-maximizing output as Q(;). Given , t in equation (9)
increases in . That is, Q(;) decreases in , the per-unit social cost from low
product quality: Note that, for a consumer with v = t, she is indi¤erent between
purchasing and not purchasing the product. In fact, since the expected social cost
from low quality under output Q(;) is (1   )Q; the same as the reduction to
the rms maximum prot, given ex ante investment ; the rm fully internalizes
the social cost from low quality when setting its price: Intuitively, a lower liability L
reduces each consumers expected utility from the product, which reduces consumer
demand; but it also decreases the rms expected marginal (ex post) cost from selling
the product. These two e¤ects happen to exactly o¤set each other. Hence, given ;
the rm bears the full social cost from low quality. Furthermore, by the envelope
theorem
d()
dL
=  Q (1  ) d
dL
= 0
when L = D: That is, if there were no ex ante investment on quality (so that  is
given), the rms prot would be maximized if there is full liability (L = D):We thus
have:
Lemma 2 Given ex ante quality investment , the expected cost from low quality is
the same for the rm as for the society, and the prot-maximizing liability is L = D;
same as the ex post socially e¢ cient liability.
The rms ex ante quality investment is determined by the following problem:
max

Q(;)[F 1(1 Q(:))  (1  )]  k():
From the envelop theorem, the optimal ex ante quality investment satises
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Q(;)  k0() = 0: (10)
Dene the rms optimal ex ante investment as (). Note that, if the rm has no
opportunity to take ex post remedy, the unit ex post social cost  from low quality
would be xed. The rms liability would then be merely a transfer between the
rm and consumers. If the rm bears larger liability, the rms ex post cost would be
increased by a certain amount; at the same time, consumerswillingness to pay would
be increased by the same amount. The e¤ects of these two changes on the rms prot
exactly cancel each other, as  () in (6) is unchanged when  is unchanged. We thus
have:
Lemma 3 If the rm could not take ex post remedy, its optimal ex ante quality
investment, the equilibrium output, and social welfare would be independent of ex post
liability L:
Now consider our general case where  is determined endogenously when both ex
ante investment and ex post remedy are possible. From condition (10), we see that a
reduction in  can either increase or decrease ; depending on how Q(;) varies
with : Therefore, the rms optimal ex ante quality investment may not be monotone
in the expected social cost. In fact, the equilibrium  is an inverted U-shaped function
of , as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique cut-o¤ b > 0, such that the rms optimal ex
ante quality investment () increases in  when  < b and decreases in  when
 > b:
Note that, from condition (10), the unit social cost  from low quality a¤ects 
both directly as a cost for each unit of output and indirectly through its e¤ect on the
output. As  increases, the direct cost e¤ect tends to raise ; whereas the indirect
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e¤ect through a reduction in output tends to lower : When  is small, the direct
e¤ect dominates; but as  increases, the indirect e¤ect eventually must dominate
since  will become zero when  is high enough. Therefore there will be some b at
which d=d = 0; and the monotonicity of H () ensures that ^ is unique. Thus the
equilibrium  is an inverted U-shaped function of :18
Since from Lemma 1 d=dL < 0 for L < D, the rms ex ante quality investment
may also be non-monotonic in the rms liability:
Corollary 1 Consider the range L  D. There exists a unique cut-o¤ bL 2 [0; D],
such that the rms optimal ex-ante quality investment () increases in L when
L < bL; and, if bL < D; () decreases in L when L > bL : Furthermore, (1   )
decreases in L and Q (;) increases in L when L < bL.
A change in product liability can potentially have two opposing e¤ects on ex ante
quality investment. On one hand, given output Q, there is a "substitution e¤ect":
more ex post remedy due to a larger L reduces , which in turn leads to lower ex
ante investment (so  is lower). On the other hand, there is an "output e¤ect":
lower  leads to a larger quantity of sales Q, which in turn increases the rms
ex-ante investment (so  is higher). Suppose that there is some interior L^ 2 (0; D)
such that b = (bL): Then, when product liability (L) is small enough, the rm has
low incentive to take ex post remedy and thus the unit ex post social cost from low
quality is high. In this case, an increase in L lowers ; which in turn raises  (since
d=d < 0 when  > ^; or L < L^): That is, the output e¤ect from the increase in
product liability dominates the substitution e¤ect, so that the rms ex ante quality
investment is higher. In contrast, when the rms liability is large (L > L^), the rm
has high incentives to take ex post remedy, which reduces the unit ex post social
18However, it is possible that the relevant  in a given problem is below ^; in which case 
monotonically increases in :
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costs ( < ^). In this case, the substitution e¤ect dominates, so that an increase
in L lowers  and also .19 Notice that L^ can be at the corner, in which case 
monotonically increases in L if L^ = D and  monotonically decreases in L when
L^ = 0: We shall later give examples where L^ can be interior or at one of the corners.
Since the unit ex post remedy cost (C); the remedy e¤ectiveness parameter (); and
the potential damage level (D) all a¤ect the unit ex post social cost of low quality (),
the rms ex ante quality investment may also not be monotone in these variables,
similarly as with product liability: The result below follows straightforwardly from
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1.
Corollary 2 Given L, there exist unique cut-o¤s C(L); (L); D(L), such that the
rms optimal ex ante quality investment () increases in C, ; and D respectively
when C < C(L);  < (L); or D < D(L), whereas () decreases in C, ; and D
respectively when C  C(L);   (L); or D  D(L).
As potential damage D increase, the rm has more incentive to take ex ante quality
investment as long as D is below the cut-o¤. However, when D becomes too large
(above the cut-o¤), the rm would rather reduce its output to lower its expected ex
post cost from low product quality, and the lower output reduces the incentive for
ex ante investment. Similarly, increasing ; the e¤ectiveness of ex post remedy, may
not always increase the ex ante quality investment or decrease the expected ex post
social cost. Therefore, policies that increase ; such as requiring rms to keep better
record of consumersinformation or monitoring rmsdisclosure of ex post remedy
information, may not always increase (expected) product quality.
We now illustrate our ndings in this section with the following examples. For both
examples, suppose that  is distributed uniformly on [0; 1];
Example 1 Suppose that consumersvalue follows the uniform distribution on [0; 1].
19Note that if bL < D; an increase in L has ambiguous e¤ects on (1 ) and Q(;) when L > bL.
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In addition, k() = 2=2 if   0:9 and k() =M if  > 0:9, where M is su¢ ciently
large (for example, M  D) so that  = 0:9.
Then, Q(;) = 1 (1 )
2
, and
() =
8<:  
2
2 2 if  < 1
0 if   1
:
Notice that () rst increases and then decreases if  < 1: Since  decreases in L
for L  D; starting from a point such that  is in the region where () decreases,
as L increases,  rst increases and eventually may decrease. Let C = 0:5 and  = 1.
We have:
(1)If D  1:172, then  decreases in L for any L  D.
(2)If D > 1:172: then there exists bL < D such that  strictly increases in L for L <bL and strictly decreases in L for L > bL. For instance, when D = 2, bL = 0:787:
In Example 1, the equilibrium  is an inverted U-shaped function of L  D when D
is high enough. Example 2 below illustrates that the equilibrium  may only weakly
decrease in L.
Example 2 Suppose that consumersvalue follows the uniform distribution on [0; 1].
In addition, k() = 2=8 if   0:9 and k() =M if  > 0:9, where M is su¢ ciently
large (for example, M  D) so that  = 0:9. Then, Q(;) = 1 (1 )
2
, and
() =
8>>><>>>:
 2
0:5 2 ; which increases in  if  < 0:472
0:9 if 0:472   < 1:555
0 if   1:555
Let C = 0:5 and  = 1.
(1)If D  0:944, then  decreases in L for any L  D (i.e. the substitution e¤ect
dominates).
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(2)If 0:944 < D  4:464: then there exists bL < D such that  increases in L for L <bL and decreases in L for L > bL.
(3)If D  4:464: then  weakly increases in L for any L  D (i.e., the output e¤ect
dominates).20
In sum, this section has shown that there may be a non-monotone relationship be-
tween the rms ex ante quality investment and ex post remedy incentives. Increasing
the rms liability may not always increase the ex ante quality investment or reduce
the expected ex post social cost. This observation will have important implications
for determining the socially optimal liability policy, which we next turn to.
4. PRIVATE V.S. SOCIAL INCENTIVES FOR PRODUCT LIABILITY
In this section, we examine how product liability L a¤ects rm prot, consumer
surplus, and social welfare. These discussions will shed light on whether it is socially
optimal to impose full liability or partial liability for the rm. As discussed in Section
3, for ease of exposition we assume L  D.
Dene social welfare as W = +U , where  is the rms expected prot and U is
the aggregate consumer surplus. From the analysis in Section 3, we have
 = max

Q(;)[F 1(1 Q(;))  (1  )]  k();
U =
Z v
t
(v   t)dF (v) =
Z v
F 1(1 Q(;))

v   F 1(1 Q(;)) dF (v):
Note that consumer surplus only depends on total output Q(;). Intuitively,
the marginal consumer with v = t is indi¤erent between purchasing and not pur-
chasing the product. From the ex ante point of view, all consumers face the same
20If D is too large, for any L  D, the rm would not product at all and, correspondingly,  = 0.
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expected harm if the product quality is low. When there are more sales, there is more
information rent for consumers.
Proposition 2 Firm prot is maximized under full liability L = D.
Thus, ex ante, the rm always prefers full liability, although ex post the rm would
prefer no liability. Intuitively, if the rm bears only partial liability, it may not take ex
post remedy as socially desired. The unit ex post social cost from low quality would
be larger. As discussed in Section 3, the rm fully internalizes the social cost from low
quality. Full liability allows the rm to create the intertemporal commitment to take
e¢ cient ex post remedy that minimizes expected unit social cost from low quality.
However, given that the rm has market power, to minimize unit ex post social cost
of low quality, the rm may reduce its output and therefore consumer surplus would
be decreased. Note that the rms output depends on its ex ante quality investment.
Some of our results below will use the following condition.
Condition T1: k000()  0 and sup  () > 1=2.
Condition T1 is satised as long as the rms ex-ante investment costs are not too
large, and the product is more likely to have high quality than to have low quality
in equilibrium. For example, it is satised if consumersvalue follows the uniform
distribution and k() = a2, for any a  1
8
.
The following lemma shows that the rms optimal quantity of sales may not be
monotone in the unit social cost of low quality.
Lemma 4 Q(;) and U decrease in  when   b; but they can increase in 
when  < b. In particular, if condition T1 holds, then there exists a cut-o¤ e < b
such that Q(;) and U increase in  if e   < b:
Intuitively, when  is large enough, as discussed in Section 3, the output e¤ect
dominates the substitution e¤ect: when  increases further, the rm takes less ex
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ante quality investment. Correspondingly, the expected unit social cost (1   )
becomes larger and reduces output even further. On the other hand, when  is small
enough, the substitution e¤ect dominates the output e¤ect: as  increases, the rm
takes more ex ante quality investment. If such ex ante investment increases more
quickly than the increase in , then the expected unit social cost (1  ) becomes
smaller and output increases.
Proposition 3 Suppose that condition T1 holds. (1) Given C and , there exist two
cut-o¤s eD < bD: If D  bD, consumer surplus is maximized under full liability; ifeD  D < bD, consumer surplus is maximized under partial liability. (2) Given D and
, there exist two cut-o¤s eC < bC : If C  bC, consumer surplus is maximized under
full liability; if eC  C < bC, consumer surplus is maximized under partial liability.
(3) Given D and C, there exist two cut-o¤s e > b : If   b, consumer surplus is
maximized under full liability; if b <   e, consumer surplus is maximized under
partial liability.
The above results provide important policy implications. In order to increase con-
sumer surplus, it may not be optimal to impose full liability for the rm. Under full
liability, the rm would take ex post remedy to minimize the unit ex-post social cost
from low quality. Anticipating this, as long as the potential damage level and remedy
cost are not too large, and ex post remedy is e¤ective enough, the rm might reduce
output ex ante, which in turn would reduce consumer surplus.
The previous analysis suggests that the rm and consumers may have conicting
incentives for full product liability. Therefore, full liability may not maximize social
welfare. Suppose that H 0(v) is bounded for any v 2 [0; v]. Dene h = maxv[ H 0(v)].
Condition T2: k000()  0 and sup  () > 2+h3+h .
For many familiar log-concave distributions, H 0(v) is bounded for any v 2 [0; v].
The above condition is satised as long as the rms ex ante investment costs are not
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too large or the probability of high quality is not always lower than 2+h
3+h
in equilibrium.
For example, T2 is satised if consumersvalue follows the uniform distribution and
k() = a2, for any a  1
8
The following proposition shows that it can be socially optimal to impose partial
liability, L < D.
Proposition 4 Suppose that condition T2 holds. (1) Given C and , there exist a
cut-o¤ D0 2 [ eD; bD): If D  bD, social welfare is maximized under full liability; if
D0  D < bD, social welfare is maximized under partial liability. (2) Given D and ,
there exists a cut-o¤ C 0 2 [ eC; bC) : If C  bC, social welfare is maximized under full
liability; if C 0  C < bC, social welfare is maximized under partial liability. (3) Given
D and C, there exists a cut-o¤ 0 2 (b; e]: If   b, social welfare is maximized
under full liability; if b <   0, social welfare is maximized under partial liability.
We illustrate the ndings with examples below:
Example 3 Suppose that consumersvalue follows the uniform distribution on [0; 1].
In addition, k() = 2=8 if   0:9 and k() =M if  > 0:9, where M is su¢ ciently
large (for example, M  D). That is,  = 0:9. Assume that  also follows the
uniform distribution on [0; 1]. As shown in Section 3, the rms optimal investment
is
() =
8>>><>>>:
 2
0:5 2 ; which increases in  if  < 0:472
0:9 if 0:472   < 1:555
0 if   1:555
Social welfare is
W = U + =
Z 1
1+(1 )
2
(v   1 + (1  )
2
)dv + [
1  (1  )
2
]2   2=8:
Thus dW
d
< 0 when   0:399 and dW
d
> 0 when 0:399 <  < 0:472. When
  0:472, () weakly decreases in  and therefore, Q(;) decreases as well. In
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this range, dW
d
< 0. In sum,
W
8>>><>>>:
decreases in  if  2 [0; 0:399]
increases in  if  2 (0:399; 0:472]
decreases in  if  2 (0:472;1)
:
Recall that
 
Z C
L
0
DdG() +
Z 1
C
L
[C + (1  )D]dG():
The following gures characterize the socially optimal liability rules.
First, given , Figure 1 illustrates how the socially optimal liability depends on
the damage level D and the remedy costs C; where the red curve is dened by C =
D D
q
1  0:944
D
; the green curve is dene by C = D D
q
1  0:614
D
; and the purple
curve is from simulation such that no liability and full liability lead to the same social
welfare for D < 0:944. Notice that full liability L = D is more e¢ cient in Range F;
partial liability L 2 (0; D) is more e¢ cient in Range P; and it is more e¢ cient to
impose no liability for the rm in Range N. These results are consistent to the general
predictions in Proposition 4.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
D
C
N
P
F
FF
Figure 1: Optimal Liability (Given  = 1)
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Second, Figure 2 illustrates how the socially optimal liability depends on the dam-
age level D, given  and the remedy costs C: full liability is more e¢ cient when
D  0:648 or D  4:464; partial liability L 2 (0; D) is more e¢ cient when the dam-
age level is intermediate (0:870  D  4: 464); zero liability is more e¢ cient when
0:648  D  0:870.
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
1
2
3
4
5
D
L*
L*=D
L*<D
Figure 2: Optimal Liability (Given  = 1 and C = 0:5)
Third, given D, Figure 3 illustrates how the socially optimal liability depends on
the e¤ectiveness () and the unit cost (C) of ex-post remedy, where the red curve is
dened by  = 0:056
(C 1)2 ; the green curve is dened by  =
0:385
(C 1)2 . As shown in Figure
3, partial liability is more e¢ cient when  or C is intermediate; otherwise full liability
is more e¢ cient.
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0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
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L*=D
0<L*<D
L*=D
Figure 3: Optimal Liability (Given D = 1)
Fourth, Figure 4 shows how the optimal liability depends on the e¤ectiveness of
ex post remedy (), given di¤erent C. For  small or large enough, full liability is
more e¢ cient. For intermediate , partial liability is more e¢ cient and the optimal
liability is decreasing in .
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Beta
L*
L*=D
L*<D
L*<D
L*=D
Figure 4: Optimal Liability (Given D = 1:Red: C = 0:1. Green: C = 0:5)
Finally, Figure 5 shows how the optimal liability depends on remedy costs C, given
di¤erent values of :For C small or large enough, full liability is more e¢ cient. For
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intermediate C, partial liability is more e¢ cient and the optimal liability is increasing
in C.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
L*
L*=DL*=D
L*<D
Figure 5: Optimal Liability (Given D = 1:Red:  = 0:5. Green:  = 0:8)
Intuitively, when the potential damage is large enough, the ex-post remedy is too
costly or not very e¤ective, the unit ex post social cost from low quality is large
enough. In this scenario, the output e¤ect dominates the substitution e¤ect of larger
liability. Therefore, when the rm bears larger liability, both output Q and the
ex ante investment  would increase, which increases overall social welfare. That
is, full liability is socially optimal. In contrast, when the potential damage, the
remedy cost or the e¤ectiveness of remedy is at intermediate level, the substitution
e¤ect dominates the output e¤ect. Moreover, when the rm bears larger liability, the
output and the ex-ante investment may decrease, which may reduce social welfare.
Therefore, partial liability can be more e¢ cient than full liability.
Proposition 4 and the above illustrations provide several interesting policy impli-
cations. A policy or liability rule should consider its e¤ects on output and address
the potential non-monotone relationship between ex ante investments and ex post
remedies. Although a larger product liability can motivate the rm to take more ex
post remedies, it may reduce ex ante investments and output. As shown in the above
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numeric examples, for a range of parameter values, partial liability is more e¢ cient
than full liability. In practice, the liability rule should depend on the potential dam-
age level and ex post remedy costs. For products with either large consumer damage
(such as cars) or small consumer damage relative to ex post remedy costs, full lia-
bility tends to be more e¢ cient than partial liability; for products with intermediate
damage compared to ex post remedy costs, partial liability is more e¢ cient.
Government agencies such as the US Food and Drug Administration have required
rms to keep better record of consumer information or monitor rmsdisclosure of
ex post remedies, in order to increase the e¤ectiveness of remedies. While we nd
such policies can often increase consumer surplus and social welfare by increasing 
or potentially reducing C; it is intriguing that a higher  or a lower C sometimes can
reduce rmsex ante investment and output, which may reduce social welfare.
5. DISCUSSIONS
5.1 Product Warranty
The previous analysis assumes that the rm cannot commit to making ex post
remedy if it bears no liability. One way for the rm to create such inter-temporal
commitment is to o¤er warranties. The existing literature on warranty mainly views
warranty as a signaling device for a rms unobservable quality choice or quality
investment (e.g. Grossman, 1981; Cooper and Ross, 1985; Lutz, 1989).21 It typically
considers a rms expected compensation to consumers when a quality problem arises,
but does not address the possibility for the rm to take ex post remedies before
consumers are harmed.
21Similarly, during sales, rms may o¤er return policies as signaling devices (Moorthy and Srini-
vasan, 1995). Return policies may also enhance risk sharing between a rm and its consumers (Che,
1996).
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Suppose that the rm could issue a warranty which species compensation L to
a consumer when she has utility loss due to low quality. The rm can take ex post
remedy after sales. As shown in Section 4, the rm prefers full warranty L = D,
which provides commitment that the rm would take e¢ cient ex post remedy. Such
a full warranty, if perfectly enforced, maximizes the rms prots.
In practice, rms often o¤er limited warranty, because a full warranty may unduly
reduce consumer care in using the product. Our ndings in Section 4 suggest that
a limited warranty can sometimes be what consumers prefer, because it can lead to
higher ex ante quality investment and output, which benets consumers.
Another potential welfare loss from full warranty is that consumers may not com-
ply with the rms ex post remedies. On one hand, with full warranty, consumers
negligence would reduce the e¤ectiveness of the rms ex post remedies; on the other
hand, it may induce the rm to make more ex ante investment. The next subsec-
tion provides more general discussions on whether consumersnegligence should be
considered in determining the rms liability.
5.2 E¤ectiveness of ex post Remedy and Consumer Negligence
Our main model assumes that  is exogenously given. In practice, the e¤ects of
ex post remedies may hinge on consumersawareness or incentives to comply with
the rms ex post remedies. Consumersincentives can be a¤ected by liability rules.
For example, courts may use either strict liability or negligence rules.22 Under strict
liability, the rm bears the same liability L no matter whether it has taken ex post
remedies or not. Under negligence rules, the rms liability may be reduced if the rm
22There is a large literature comparing strict liability and negligence rules. For examples, see
Brown (1973), Green (1976), Shavell (1980), Rubinfeld (1987), Emons (1990), Emons and Sobel
(1991) , Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2003),
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has taken ex post remedies and consumers get informed but do not comply.23 Under
negligence rules, consumers have more incentives to comply with the rms remedies
such as recalls.
Assume that, under strict liability as analyzed in Section 3, the ex post remedy can
x a proportion  of the sold product; under the negligence rule, the ex post remedy
can x a proportion N >  of the sold product.
Under the negligence rule, the rm will take ex post remedies if and only if CNQ <
LQ: Given low product quality, the expected ex post social costs per unit of the
product are dened as
N =
Z CN
L
DdG() +
Z
CN
L
[NC + (1  N)D]dG():
In contrast, as shown in Section 3, under strict liability, the rm will take ex post
remedies if and only if CQ < LQ: Given low product quality, the expected ex
post social costs per unit of the product are dened as
S =
Z C
L
DdG() +
Z
C
L
[C + (1  )D]dG():
When the legal system is changed from strict liability to negligence rules, the rm
is more likely to take ex post remedies, since CN
L
< C
L
. However, this change may not
necessarily increase ex post e¢ ciency. Note that it is ex post socially e¢ cient to take
remedies only when   C
D
: If ND  L, then CD  CNL < CL . That is, the negligence
rule leads the rm to take more e¢ cient ex post remedies and furthermore, the ex post
remedies become more e¤ective. Under this scenario, ex post social costs are reduced,
i.e., N < S. In contrast, if ND < L, then
CN
L
< C
D
, that is, the negligence rule
leads the rm to take too many ex post remedies relative to socially desired; but the
23The choice between strict liability and negligence rules may a¤ect the rms incentives to take
ex-post remedies, for example, as discussed in Hua (2009).
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ex post remedies become more e¤ective. Under this scenario, negligence rules may
lead to either higher or lower ex post social costs than strict liability.
For simplicity, suppose that ND  L. Based on the above discussions, N < S.
However, as shown in Section 4, decreasing unit ex post social costs may not increase
social welfare. According to Proposition 4, if condition T2 holds, there exists a non-
empty set (0; b) such that, for any  2 (0; b) , dU
d
+ d
d
> 0; for any   b ,
dU
d
+ d
d
 0. Therefore, if 0 < N < S < b, strict liability is socially more
e¢ cient, even though the negligence rule results in more ex post e¢ ciency. The full-
edged comparison between strict liability and negligence rules is ambiguous in this
general framework. However, this section illustrates that the choice between strict
liability and negligence rules should also take rmsex-ante quality investment and
ex-ante output into consideration. If negligence rules increase ex post e¢ ciency but
reduce rmsex ante quality investment and ex ante output signicantly, then it may
be more e¢ cient to impose strict liability or set a higher standard for evidence in
determining consumersnegligence.
5.3 Punitive Damage Compensation
Our main analysis in Sections 3 and 4 focuses on the scenario with L  D. In
practice, sometimes courts may impose punitive damage compensation so that L > D.
If there is punitive compensation, as shown in Lemma 1, the rm would take ex post
remedy more frequently than socially desired. In addition, the following lemma shows
that, as long as punitive damage compensation cannot be too large (perhaps because
rms can resort to bankruptcy protection), partial liability L < D can lead to the
same unit ex post social cost as punitive damage compensation.
Lemma 5 (1) Suppose that
R 1
0
(C   D)dG() > 0. There exists a cut-o¤ L >
28
D : for any punitive damage compensation L 2 (D;L], there exists L0 < D such
that (L) = (L0). If L > L, (L) > (L0) for any L0 < D. (2) Suppose thatR 1
0
(C   D)dG()  0. For any punitive damage compensation L > D, there exists
L0 < D such that (L) = (L0).
The rms liability only a¤ects the level of unit ex post social cost , but does not
directly a¤ect the rms optimal quantity of sales and the ex ante quality investment.
Therefore, the rms liability only inuences social welfare through the change of .
For punitive damage compensation L 2 (D;L], we can always nd a partial liability
level which leads to the same ex post social cost and correspondingly, the same social
welfare.
Proposition 5 Suppose that condition T2 holds and
R 1
0
(C   D)dG() > 0. There
exists a cut-o¤ D00 > D0: for D  D00;punitive damage compensation L > L > D is
socially more e¢ cient than L  D, when D 2 (D0; D00); C 2 (C 0; bC); or  2 (b; 0)
respectively.
Intuitively, although punitive damage compensation may cause the rm to take
more ex post remedy than socially desired, similar to partial liability, it may increase
the rms ex ante quality investment and the output level. Therefore, very larger
punitive damage compensation may increase social welfare, although it reduces ex
post social e¢ ciency. However, if the punitive damage compensation cannot be too
large, it can always be replaced by a certain level of partial liability. In practice, it is
often di¢ cult to impose very large punitive damage compensation, especially when
rms face nancial constraints or the legal enforcement is not perfect.
5.4 Alternative Quality Investment Technology
In the main model, the rms ex ante quality investment  a¤ects the probability for
the product to have low quality. Given the product of low quality, the likelihood for
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consumers to be harmed, , is uncertain but not contingent on . For example, before
sales, the rmmay take R&D investment to have safer product design. However, there
is still non-trivial probability for the product to have design defect. Given the design
defect, the likelihood for consumers to be harmed depends on the nature of the defect
as well as consumersusage. The results on the relationship between ex ante quality
investment and ex post remedies would still hold in an alternative scenario where the
rms ex ante investment  a¤ects the distribution of .
In particular, suppose that the rm can take ex ante investment  and the likelihood
for consumers to be harmed, ; follows a distribution G( j ). After sales, the rm
privately learns the realization of  and then decides whether to take ex post remedy.
Assume G0( j )  0. That is, G( j ) rst-order stochastic dominates G( j 0) for
any  < 0. Without loss of generalization, we focus on the scenario with L  D.
In the ex post period, the rm will take remedies if and only if CQ < LQ,
or equivalently,  > C
L
:Therefore, from the ex ante point of view, given , the rms
expected unit ex post cost is
x =
Z C
L
LdG( j ) +
Z
C
L
[C + (1  )L]dG( j ):
For a particular consumer, his ex post cost is
y =
Z C
L
(D   L)dG( j ) +
Z
C
L
[(1  )(D   L)]dG( j ):
The expected ex post social cost per unit of the product is dened as
(; L) = x+ y =
Z C
L
DdG( j ) +
Z
C
L
[C + (1  )D]dG( j ):
Similar to the analysis in Section 3, given the ex ante quality investment , the
rm chooses Q to maximize its prots
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max
Q1
Q(p  x) = max
Q1
Q[F 1(1 Q)  (x+ y)] = max
Q1
Q[F 1(1 Q) (; L)]:
Dene
t = F 1(1 Q);
then the above equation becomes
t  1  F (t)
f(t)
= (; L):
Dene the rms prot-maximizing output as Q = Q((; L)). The rms quality
investment is determined by the following problem:
max

Q((; L))[F 1(1 Q((; L))) (; L)]  k():
The optimal ex ante quality investment satises
Q((; L))(; L)  k0() = 0: (11)
Similar to the analysis in Section 3, when the rms liability L increases , again
there are two conicting e¤ects on the ex-ante quality investment. On one hand,
given the output Q, there is a substitution e¤ect between ex ante quality investment
and ex post remedy. On the other hand, there is an output e¤ect: lower (; L) may
lead to a larger output Q, which in turn increases the rms quality investment .
Therefore, the rms optimal ex ante investment may not be monotone in its liability.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has studied how product liability a¤ects product quality/safety as well
as consumer and social welfare. We nd that the interactions between a rms ex
post remedy for low product quality and its incentive for ex ante quality investment
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have important implications for the e¤ects of product liability. Higher liability in-
creases ex post remedy activities, and this can in turn reduce the incentive for ex ante
investment. On the other hand, higher liability increases consumer demand for the
product, which in turn increases the rms incentive for ex ante quality investment.
The presence of these two opposing e¤ects, the substitution e¤ect and the output
e¤ect, implies that the ex ante quality investment may not monotonically increase
in product liability the relationship is sometimes an inverted U-shape curve. While
full liability maximizes prot since it allows the rm to make the intertemporal com-
mitment for ex post remedy, it may not be optimal for consumers when it reduces ex
ante quality investment by the rm. Full product liability tends to be socially opti-
mal when the potential consumer loss from low quality is su¢ ciently high; otherwise
partial liability can be socially optimal.
There are fruitful and related topics for further research. First, given the trade-
o¤s between the substitution e¤ect and the output e¤ect, rmsex ante investment
and ex post remedy e¤ort could be either substitutes or complements. It would be
useful to empirically verify which e¤ect would dominate under di¤erent liability rules.
Second, competition among di¤erent rms may a¤ect their ex ante investment and
ex post remedies such as recalls. On one hand, keeping other things xed, more
competition may force rms to increase ex ante investment. On the other hand, with
more competition, rms may have more concern about reputation and issue recalls,
which may either decrease or increase their ex ante investment. Furthermore, rms
may consider continuing sales after product recalls. It would be interesting to explore
how reputation concern interacts with liability rules and how they jointly a¤ect rms
ex ante investments and ex post remedies. Finally, our current paper assumes that
consumers can observe the rms ex ante investment. If consumers could not observe
the rms investment, the rms pricing may not only signal its quality investment as
shown in the literature, but may also signal its probability of taking ex post remedies.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. Given , the rms optimal output Q(;) satises (9), from which we obtain
Q0M(;) =
@Q
@t
@t
@
=  f(t) 1  
1 H 0(t) :
The optimal  satises either  =  or condition (10).
First, when  = 0, condition (10) implies that () = 0. (If there is no ex
post social cost, the rm would not make any ex ante investment.) When  goes
to innity, condition (9) and (8) imply Q(;) = 0; which also implies () = 0:
Therefore d=d > 0 when  is su¢ ciently small but  eventually decreases in 
when  is su¢ ciently large. It su¢ ces to consider two cases as follows.
(1) Consider the case with interior solution: There exists some b at which d=d =
0: From (10), we have
d
d
=  Q(;) +Q
0
M(;)
Q0(;)  k00()
:
Note that the second order condition
Q0(;)  k00()  0
for interior solutions () 2 (0; ). Thus, the sign of d
d
is determined by that of
Q(;) +Q0M(;):
In particular, Q(;) = 1  F (t) by denition. Thus,
Q(;) +Q0M(;) = 1  F (t) f(t)
1  
1 H 0(t) :
Equivalently,
Q(;) +Q0M(;)
f(t)
=
1  F (t)
f(t)
  1  
1 H 0(t) = H(t) 
(1  )
1 H 0(t) :
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Therefore, the sign of d
d
is the same as that of H(t)  (1 )
1 H0(t) : Since by assumption
f(v) is log-concave, H 0(t)  0 and H 00(t)  0.
Suppose that, given a particular ; d
d
 0, or equivalently, H(t)   (1 )
1 H0(t)  0:
When increases marginally; () cannot increase. This implies that (1 ) would
increase. According to condition (9), if (1   ) increases, t must increase as well.
Correspondingly, H(t) and 1   H 0(t) would decrease. Hence H(t)   (1 )
1 H0(t) would
decrease and become even more negative. Therefore, if we start at some  such that
d
d
 0; for any larger ; d
d
< 0:This implies that there must be a unique cut-o¤ b
such that d
d
R 0 when  S b:
(2) Now consider the case with corner solution or discontinuity in (): that is,
there exists some b at which  =  but d=d > 0. Since  = , increasing 
marginally from b cannot increase the rms ex-ante investment  further. There-
fore, according to condition (9), t must increase, or equivalently, Q(;) must de-
crease. When  increases further, Q(;) decreases and gets closer to zero, so that
Q(;)  k0() eventually becomes negative, that is, d
d
 0. The rest of the proof
is similar to that in part (1).
Proof of Corollary 1:
Proof. According to Lemma 1,  decreases in L given L  D. Let bL be such that
L^ =
8>>><>>>:
L^ if b = (bL) for bL 2 (0; D)
D if (D)  ^
0 if (0)  ^
Then, when L < bL, (L) > b. Within this range, a higher liability L; through
decreasing , increases . Therefore, (1 ) decreases in L. According to condition
(9), t H(t) = (1 ) , where t = F 1(1 Q), it then follows that Q(;) increases
in L. In contrast, if L^ < D; (L) < b when L > L^; in which case () decreases in
L: We have that bL = 0 if for any L  D; (L)  (0)  b . Similarly, bL = D if for
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any L  D; (L)  (D)  b .
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. The rms optimal investment satises
max

Q(;)[F 1(1 Q(;))  (1  )]  k():
For any  and Q, the objective function is higher with lower . Therefore, the
maximal prot also decreases in . When L = D,  is the lowest and  is the
highest.
Proof of Lemma 4:
Proof. The rms optimal output is determined by
t  1  F (t)
f(t)
= t H(t) = (1  );
where t = F 1(1 Q): The optimal quality investment  satises either  =  or the
following condition
Q(;)  k0() = 0
According to Proposition 1, when   b, () weakly decreases in . Therefore,
when  increases, (1 ) would increase. Correspondingly, Q(;) would decrease.
When  < b, () increases in  and therefore (1   ) may increase or decrease
in . Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we have
Q0M(;) =  f(t)
1  
1 H 0(t)
and
Q0(;) =
f(t)
1 H 0(t) :
Therefore,
d[(1  )]
d
= (1  )  d
d
= (1  ) + Q(;) +Q
0
M(;)
Q0(;)  k00()
= (1  ) + 
(1  F (t)) f(t) 1 
1 H0(t)
2f(t)
1 H0(t)   k00()
:
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Note that the second order condition implies Q0(;)   k00()  0 for interior
solutions. Thus, (1  ) +  (1 F (t)) f(t)
1 
1 H0(t)
2f(t)
1 H0(t) k00()
< 0 is equivalent to
(1  F (t)) 2f(t) 1  
1 H 0(t) > (1  )(k
00()  
2f(t)
1 H 0(t)); or
(1  F (t)) > (1  )k00():
Given
Q(;)  k0() = 0;
the above condition becomes k0() > (1   )k00(). Therefore, as long as k0() >
(1   )k00(), d[(1 )]
d
< 0 so that Q(;) increases in . If k000()  0, for any
 > 1=2, we have
k0()  k00() > (1  )k00():
According to Proposition 1, when  < b,  increases in . Therefore, since condi-
tion T1 holds, there exists a cut-o¤ e < b such that  > 1=2 when  2 (e; b].
Correspondingly, Q(;) increases in  when  2 (e; b].
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. According to Lemma 1,  decreases in  and increases C andD. Given C and
, there always exists bD such that(L = bD) = b. According to Proposition 1, b > 0
and therefore bD > 0. Given condition T1, there exists eD such that (L = eD) = e.
Then If D  bD, (L < D) > (L = D)  b. In this range, according to Lemma
4, U decrease in  and therefore consumer surplus is maximized under L = D. IfeD  D < bD; then e   < b. In this range, according to Lemma 4, U increase in
 and therefore consumer surplus is maximized under L < D. The proof for part (2)
and part (3) is similar to the above.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. First, when D  bD, Propositions 2 and 3 imply that both the rm and
consumers prefer L = D. Therefore, full liability is socially optimal. In the following
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analysis, suppose D < bD.
Note that
d
d
=  (1  )Q(;)
and
dU
d
=
dU
dt
dt
d
=  (1  F (t)) dt
d
=  Q(;) dt
d
:
Given t  1 F (t)
f(t)
= t H(t) = (1  );
dt
d
=
1
1 H 0(t)
d[(1  )]
d
=
1
1 H 0(t)f(1  ) 
(1  F (t)) f(t) 1 
1 H0(t)
k00()  2f(t)
1 H0(t)
g:
Note that
(1  F (t)) = Q(;) = k0():
Then we have
dU
d
= Q(;)f
k0() 2f(t) 1 
1 H0(t)
k00()(1 H 0(t)) 2f(t)  
1  
1 H 0(t)g:
If dU
d
+ d
d
> 0, then increasing  would increase social welfare.
dU
d
+
d
d
> 0
is equivalent to
k0() 2f(t) 1 
1 H0(t)
k00()(1 H 0(t)) 2f(t)  
1  
1 H 0(t) > 1  :
The second order condition of (10)implies
k00()(1 H 0(t)) 2f(t) > 0:
Therefore, the above inequality is equivalent to
k0() > (1  )k00()[2 H 0(t)]  (1  )2f(t):
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If k000()  0;for any  > 2+h
3+h
,
k0()  k00() > (1  )k00()[2 + h]
 (1  )k00()[2 H 0(t)]  (1  )k00()[2 H 0(t)]  (1  )2f(t):
Therefore, given condition T2, there exists a non-empty set (0; b) such that, if
 2 (0; b) , dU
d
+ d
d
> 0 . Since condition T2 implies condition T1 but the reverse
might not be true, it can be veried that 0  e, where e is dened in Lemma 4:
Given C and , dene D0 such that (L = D0) = 0. Then if D  bD, dU
dL
+ d
dL
< 0;
if D0  D < bD, dU
d
+ d
d
> 0. The proof for part (2) and part (3) is similar to the
above.
Proof of Lemma 5:
Proof. According to Lemma 1,  decreases in L when L  D and increases in L
when L > D. Note that (L = 0) =
R 1
0
DdG() > (L = D). When L goes to
innity, (L ! 1) = R 1
0
[C + (1   )D]dG(). (1) If R 1
0
(C   D)dG() > 0,
then (L ! 1) > (L = 0). Given continuity, there exists L > D such that
(L = L) = (L = 0). Therefore, for any L 2 (D;L], there exists L0 < D such that
(L) = (L0). (2) If
R 1
0
(C   D)dG()  0; then (L ! 1)  (L = 0):In this
case, for any punitive damage compensation L > D, there exists L0 < D such that
(L) = (L0).
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof. Similar to the proof for Proposition 4, if condition T2 holds; there exists a
non-empty set (0; b) such that, if  2 (0; b) , dU
d
+ d
d
> 0 .Note that, if L = 0,
 = E[]D. Dene D00 as E[]D00 = 0. Then according to Proposition 4, when
D 2 (D0; D00); C 2 (C 0; bC); or  2 (b; 0), (L) 2 (0; b) for any L  D. Thus,
(L) 2 (0; b) for any L 2 (D;L]: since dU
d
+ d
d
> 0 , L > L is socially more
e¢ cient than any L  L.
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